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EVOLUTION IN WASHINGTON CHOICE OF LAW-
A BEGINNING
PHILIP A. TRAUTMAN*
Professor Trautman discusses Washington's new "most signi-
ficant relationship" approach to conflict of laws by examining the
recent cases of Baffin and Goble in relation to traditional ap-
proaches and the Restatement (Second). Because the cases mark
the beginning of an evolutionary process in Washington, the
author emphasizes the need to explore, find, and articulate the
relevant factors to be considered in applying the "most significant
relationship" test. Professor Trautman gives the Washington
court and bar some useful beginning points for the case-by-case
development of new and better conflict of laws rules.
"Outside of this area [conflicts law of torts] we are, I believe,
faced with neither revolution nor counter-revolution but with the
need for quiet evolution."'
INTRODUCTION
Even before the issuance of the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws in 1934. the vested rights theory which it was
to embody had been subjected to attack.' By this theory rights and
obligations are created in the state where certain designated events
occur. For example, in torts it is the place of injury; in contracts, the
place of making; in transfers inter vivos of a chattel, the place of its
situs; in marriage, the domicile of the parties or the place of celebra-
tion; etc.' The past three decades have witnessed almost unanimous
agreement in the scholarly writings in attacking and rejecting the the-
ory." In the courts, where even in the thirties and forties there was
doubt whether the theory was actually being applied,5 the fifties and
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., 1952, LL.B., 1954, University
of Washington.
'Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Covers,
80 HAmv. L. REv. 377, 378 (1966).
2 Cook, The Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457
(1924); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 736 (1924).3 G. STUBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 9 (3d ed. 1963).
'D. CAVERS, THE CroIcE-o-LAw PRocEss 12 (1965).
'P. LEFLAR, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 4 (1959).
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sixties have seen express judicial rejections.' Rejection of vested rights
and its accompanying choice of law rules, presents the problem of what
theory, what approach, what rules or guides should be instituted in its
place.
Recently Washington joined the courts and writers who have chosen
to discard the traditional choice of law rules and seek new solutions.
In Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc.,7 an action was
brought to collect delinquent payments under a television rental agree-
ment with an option to purchase made between a Delaware corpora-
tion, authorized to do business in Washington, and Mr. Clark, who, on
behalf of the marital community of himself and his wife, was operating
the Monticello Inn in Washington. The agreement was signed in
Washington by Mr. Clark and a salesman of the corporation and for-
warded to New York where it was signed by a vice president. Under
the provisions of the agreement, a binding contract was not formed
until the signature was affixed in New York. Subsequently, the Clarks
were divorced. The trial court entered a judgment against the Inn and
Mr. Clark but denied recovery against the wife. It stated that the
obligations of the contract were governed by the rule of lex loci con-
tractus and because the last act necessary to form a binding contract
occurred in New York, New York law governed. The trial court
further found that under New York law neither the wife nor the com-
munity was liable.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed. After noting that the
vested rights theory is now "largely discredited," the court invoked a
rule that the law of the state with which a contract has the most
significant relationship will govern the validity and effect of the con-
tract. The new approach is flexible: consideration may be given to
factors other than the place of making, such as the place intended by
the parties, place of performance, and the place under whose law the
agreement would be most effective.' The court said that the approach
"E.g., Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 801 (1964).
"The basic theme running through the attacks on the place of the injury rule is that
wooden application of a few overly simple rules, based on the outmoded 'vested rights
theory,' cannot solve the complex problems which arise in modern litigation and may
often yield harsh, unnecessary and unjust results." And id. at 806: "We acknowledge
that in adopting a new approach in the area of choice of law, of necessity, we overrule
our earlier cases based on the lex loci delecti rule."
7 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 865, 425 P.2d 623 (1967).
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §332b (Tent. Draft No. 6, as
modified Nov., 1960), was cited as listing factors which often are significant. The
section provides:
(1) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, consideration will
be given to the following factors, among others, in determining the state with
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is not one of counting contacts but rather of considering which con-
tacts are most significant and determining where those contacts are
found.
The parties had not expressly selected a governing law. While New
York was the place of contracting, Washington was "at least partially"
the place of negotiation, the place of major performance, the place of
the subject matter of the contract, and the domicile of the defendants;
and the Delaware corporation was authorized and doing business in
Washington. Viewed as a contract for the rendition of services, the
place of performance was seen as the most significant contact. Viewed
as a contract for the sale of chattels, the most significant contact was
the state where, under the terms of the contract, the seller was to
deliver the chattel. The court concluded that various approaches led to
Washington as the state with the most significant relationship. It was
held that the agreement signed by the husband created a community
obligation and that the plaintiff was entitled to satisfy its judgment out
which the contract has its most significant relationship: (a) the place of con-
tracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of perform-
ance, (d) the situs of the subject matter of the contract, (e) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,
(f) the place under whose local law the contract will be most effective. (2) If
the place of contracting, the place of negotiating the contract and the place of
performance are in the same state, the local law of this state ordinarily determines
the validity of the contract, except in the case of usury (see § 334d) and as
stated in §§ 346e to 346n.
The court indicated that the November, 1960 modifications to Tentative Draft No. 6
were to be found in Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement
of Conflict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IowA L. REv. 713 (1961). The following letter,
dated July 10, 1967, from Professor Willis L. M. Reese, Reporter for the Restatement
(Second), to Professor Marian G. Gallagher, Law Librarian of the University of
Washington, is of interest:
The November 1960 modification to tentative draft no. 6 is purely unofficial.
I prepared this modification after the May 1960 meeting and somehow it found its
way into the Supplement to our Casebook. [E. CHEATHAM, H. GOODRICH, E.
GRISWOLD & W REESE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAwS 62-63
(Supp. 1961)] Professor Weintraub must have picked it up there. In other
words, this revision does not appear in any American Law Institute publication
and has not received any American Law Institute approval.
The sections may also be found in E. CHEATHAm, E. GRISWOLD, W. REESE & M.
ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAwS 543-45 and 556-57 (5th ed.
1964).
It seems likely that the Washington court would have reached the same result in
Baffin under the original wording of § 332b, which was approved by the Council by
a vote of 13 to 12 and is as follows:
In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, (a) if the place of
contracting and the place of performance are in the same state, the local law of
this state determines the validity of the contract, except in the case of usury
(see § 334d) and as stated in §§ 346e to 346n, (b) if performance is to occur wholl)
or in substantial part in a state other than that of contracting, or if the place of
performance is uncertain, additional factors will be considered in determining
the state with which the contract has its most significant relationship and which
therefore is the state of the governing law.
1967]
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of any property held by either spouse which was formerly the couple's
community property.
The effects of the decision will be far-reaching. The case not only
resulted in the allowance of a recovery which had been previously
denied, thereby pointing up the possible practical implications of the
change in choice of law approach, but it also indicated a willingness of
the court to broaden its horizons in choice of law matters and to move
beyond the traditional black-letter rules.' This, of course, will require
more imagination, insight, and thought from counsel in the future.
While the court placed considerable emphasis upon the tentative
draft of the Restatement (Second)o and acknowledged its reliance on
the work of the drafters as the basic stepping stone in its attempt to
arrive at a better contracts-choice of law doctrine, it did not restrict it-
self to that document or to any other particular authority. In adopting
((only so many rules and guidelines as are necessary to handle the prob-
lems before us," the court allowed for future development. Thus the
court may accept or reject specific implementations to be suggested by
counsel, by the decisions of other courts, and by scholars. Whereas the
door has been closed in the past to choice of law growth in Washington,
it has now been opened and, wisely, left open in view of the nature of
the subject matter. The evolutionary process has begun.
The process continued with Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v. Goble,"
decided the same day as Baffin. In Goble quarry machinery located in
Oregon was sold by plaintiff, a Washington corporation, to Goble and
Wallace, who, with their wives, were Washington residents. The con-
ditional sales contract was signed in Oregon, after which the machinery
was removed to Washington. The purchasers defaulted in their pay-
ments and an action was instituted against them, their wives, and the
respective marital communities. The trial court applied the rule of
lex loci contractus, and because the contract was made in Oregon, that
law governed. Relying upon an earlier Washington case,12 the trial
court held that under Oregon law neither the defendant wives nor the
defendant communities were liable; judgment was entered only against
' It is noteworthy that there were no dissents. Judges Hill, Rosellini, Ott, Hunter,
Hamilton and Hale concurred in Chief Justice Finley's opinion. Judges Donworth
and Weaver concurred in the result.
"The following sections of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960) were cited: § 332, as modified Nov., 1960; § 332a; § 332b,
as modified Nov., 1960; §346g; and §3461. Also cited was Tent. Draft No. 6,
Introductory Note, § 2 (1961).
"70 Wash. Dec. 2d 879, 425 P.2d 631 (1967).
"Escrow Service Co. v. Cressler, 59 Wn. 2d 38, 365 P.2d 760 (1961).
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Goble and Wallace. The Washington Supreme Court reversed that
portion of the judgment which dismissed the action as to the communi-
ties. While the court said that Oregon law would apply under the
significant relationship test of Baffin, the actual basis for the decision
was that a true choice of law problem was not presented because the
result would be the same under either Oregon or Washington law.
By a long line of cases it had been established that if a Washington
husband incurred an obligation in a non-community property state,
only his separate property could be subjected to the satisfaction of the
debt, even though it would have resulted in community liability had
the same obligation been incurred in Washington. 3 Under the rule of
lex loci contractus, the nature and character of the debt, including
whether it was community or separate, was determined by the place of
making. In a non-community property state it was, of course, separate,
and therefore only separate property was liable on the debt.
As critics had noted for many years,'4 it did not follow that com-
munity property should not be liable in a community property state.
Had everything occurred either in Oregon or Washington, the plain-
tiff-creditor would have been able to reach all property of the married
couple, except that separately owned by the wife. To deny the plain-
tiff the right to reach the community property in Washington under
the facts of Goble, as had been done in the past, thwarted the applica-
tion of the policy of each state as embodied in its law. A different out-
come resulted simply because two states were involved.
The immediate effect of the decision is to change the community
liability in interstate transactions. Equally important is the approach
taken by the Washington court to the resolution of the choice of law
problem. The court did not automatically apply a black-letter rule,
such as the place of making. It neither simply counted contacts, nor
applied the law of the place of most significant relationship without
considering the content of the laws of the involved states. It recog-
nized that its concern was with a "choice of law" rather than a "choice
"Escrow Service Co. v. Cressler, 59 Wn. 2d 38, 365 P.2d 760 (1961); Achilles v.
Hoopes, 40 Wn. 2d 664, 245 P.2d 1005 (1952); Meng v. Security State Bank, 16 Wn.
2d 215, 133 P.2d 293 (1943) ; Huyvaerts v. Roedtz, 105 Wash. 657, 178 Pac. 801 (1919)
Clark v. Eltinge, 29 Wash. 215, 69 Pac. 736 (1902) ; La Selle v. Woolery, 14 Wash. 70,
44 Pac. 115 (1896). Co,npare Household Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 378,
423 P.2d 621 (1967), cited in Goble as foreshadowing what was to come.
" The court cited H. GooDRicH, CoNrFLicr oF LAWS § 126 (4th ed. 1964) ; H. MARSH,
MARITAL PROPERTY IN CoNFLIcT OF LAWS 148 (1952); Note, 31 WAsH. L. REv. 119(1956); and Note, Liability of the Community for Separate Debts of Husband in
Conflict of Laws, 11 WASH. L. REv. 166 (1936). See also Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 267, 290 (1966).
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of jurisdiction."'" In looking to the purposes of the law of each state,
the policies sought to be implemented, and the result which would be
attained by its application, the opinion was superior to Baffin. By
doing this the court found there was no conflict because the law of
both states was the same. 6
The combination of Baffin and Goble constitutes the most important
development in Washington's choice of law history." The court will
examine the laws of the potential governing states to ascertain both
content and results in application. By this technique false conflicts
may be eliminated as advocated in much of today's scholarly writingis
That it is not as obvious as might first appear is shown by the series of
Washington cases prior to Goble. 9 If there is a conflict, the court will
apply a most significant relationship test, at least with respect to
contract-choice of law problems.
The literature relating to the most significant relationship approach
demonstrates disagreement as to both its desirability and proper appli-
cation. An investigation of the approach can best begin with an
analysis of the Restatement (Second) for, even though the Washington
Court did not purport to adopt everything therein, the work of the
drafters was used as "the basic stepping stone."
I. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AND ITS CRITICS
Contracts is frequently referred to as the most complex and con-
fused part of the conflict of laws.2 0 Authority may be found supporting
at least five rules to resolve contract problems: place of making, place
of performance, place intended by the parties, place whose law will
"See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. Rav. 173
(1933).
" It appears that Baffin could have been resolved on the same basis as Goble,
namely, that there was a false conflict.
"As with Baffin, Goble was written by Chief Justice Finley and concurred in by
all other eight judges, with Judges Hill, Rosellini, Ott, Hunter, Hamilton and Hale
joining in the opinion, and Judges Donworth and Weaver, in the result.
18Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657 (1959);
Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267,
289-90 (1966); D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS 89 (1965). Compare
Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multi-
state Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847 (1967).
" Perhaps the best known "false conflicts" case is Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb.
N. Cas. 210 (1883), in which a contract was sustained even though bad under the
statutes of frauds of both concerned states. See the discussion in Weintraub, 4
Method for Solving Conflict Problems, 21 U. PITT. L. REV. 573, 579 (1959).
' R. LEFLAR, THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 232 (1959) ; Reese, Contracts and the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, 9 INT'L & Co-mp. L.Q. 531 (1960) ; A. Vo.N
MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 183 (1965). But see
Enrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Covers, 80
HARv. L. REv. 377, 381 (1966).
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sustain the validity of the contract, and place of most significant rela-
tionship.2 This is not surprising in view of the many types of con-
tracts, diversity of issues, and multiple connections a contract may
have with several states. The complexity is compounded by the fact
that the multiplicity of authority exists not only among different states,
but within the same state. It is not uncommon to find one jurisdiction
having adopted several of the rules and applying each as if the others
did not exist.22
It was out of this background of confusion and general rejection of
the vested rights theory that the Restatement (Second) was drafted,
embodying the significant relationship test.23 Factors to be considered
were indicated as including, among others, the place of contracting,
negotiation, and performance, the situs of the subject matter of the
contract, the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and the place under whose local
law the contract will be most effective.24
One of the difficulties with this type of listing is that courts may tend
to engage in contact-counting and apply the law of that state which
has the greater numerical contacts. 25 Although Baffin explicitly re-
jected contact-counting, it will be critical in the future for counsel and
the court to constantly keep in mind that significant relationship has
reference, not to the number of contacts, but to the significance of the
relationship of the contacts to the issue to be resolved. 6 Qualitative
rather than quantitative evaluation must determine the "most signi-
ficant relationship. '27
One of the chief benefits of the approach is the flexibility created in
allowing the court to adjust to the many different contract problems
that may arise. In turn, certainty and predictability are lessened. This
I G. STUMBERG, PRINrCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAxVS 226-41 (3d ed. 1963).
R . LEnL~A, THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAws 234 (1959).
' Reese, Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, 9 INT'L &
ComP. L.Q. 531, 537-38 (1960).
-RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332b (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
A subsection of the original April 1960 version provided, "if the place of contracting
and the place of performance are in the same state, the local law of this state deter-
mines the validity of the contract...." The November 1960 modification reads, "if
the place of contracting, the place of negotiating the contract, and the place of per-
formance are in the same state, the local law of this state ordinarily determines the
validity of the contract. ..."
' See Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Conflict
of Laws-A Critique, 46 IOWA L. Rxv. 713, 724 (1961).
'Weintraub, supra note 25, at 725. Reference is made to Professor Reese's
interpretation of "most significant relationship" as meaning "What is the most
significant relationship to the issue before me?"
Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLUm. L. RZv. 1247, 1248 (1963).
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may create some difficulties for the parties when entering into their
contracts and for counsel in advising their clients and later in nego-
tiating a settlement. A modifying factor is that in many instances, per-
haps most, the state of most significant relationship will be apparent.
To the extent that is not so and that there was certainty under an
earlier mechanical rule, that certainty may very well have been pur-
chased at the price of justice. It is difficult to believe that the subject
matter of contracts could adequately be encompassed by one precise
black-letter rule.28
The multiplicity of past rules suggests, however, that it is more
likely that the asserted certainty of the past was artificial and that
predictability was on the surface. Such pretense could only mislead
counsel by encouraging reliance upon rules that did not actually relate
to the true elements affecting the courts' decisions. An admission of the
complexity of the problem, by acknowledging a lack of certainty,
forces counsel and the courts to direct their attention to those issues
and policies pertinent to the particular case. 9
In addition, the possibility of obtaining certainty is provided for in
the approach of the Restatement (Second) by empowering the parties
to choose their law. 0 Dicta in Baffin stated that the new rule would
give more emphasis to the desires and expectations of the parties than
did the rule of lex loci contractus, as the state with the most significant
See Reese, Power of Parties to Choose Law Governing Their Contract, 1960
PROC. AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 49.
' See R. LEFLAR, THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 125 (1959).
'°RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332 and 322a (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1960). As modified November, 1960, § 332 provides:
(1) The validity of a contract is determined by the local law of the state with
which the contract has its most significant relationship, except as stated in
§ 332a and in the case of usury (see § 334d). (2) The state of most significant
relationship is the state chosen by the parties, if there has been compliance with
the requirements of the rule of § 332a, and otherwise the state selected by appli-
cation of the rule of § 332b.
As modified November 1960, § 332a, subsection 1 provides:
The validity of a contract is determined by the local law of the state chosen by
the parties for this purpose, unless (a) the choice of law was obtained by unfair
means or was the result of mistake, or (b) the contract has no substantial
relationship with the chosen state and there is no other reasonable basis for the
parties' choice, or (c) application of the chosen law would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of the state which would be the state of the governing law in
the absence of an effective choice by the parties.
These provisions are discussed in Reese, Power of Parties to Choose Law Gov-
erning Their Contract, 1960 PROC. Am. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 49, and Reese, Contracts &
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, 9 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 531 (1960).
Criticism of the parties' choice provision, seeking certainty, as inconsistent with the
significant relationship provision, seeking flexibility, is found in Szold, Comments on
Tentative Draft No. 6 of the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws-Contracts, 76
HARV. L. REv. 1524 (1963). In response thereto, see Braucher, Impromptu Remarks
76 HARv. L. REV. 1718 (1963).
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relationship will be the state chosen by the parties, if an actual valid
choice is made.31
Several limitations upon the parties' power to choose the governing
law are stated by the Restatement (Second). If the choice was ob-
tained by unfair means or was the result of mistake, effect will be
denied. Unfair means include misrepresentation, duress, and undue
influence. The effect of the choice in a contract of adhesion is stated
more generally. The choice of law provision will be disregarded if its
application would result in "substantial injustice." This seems an ade-
quate standard as it encourages consideration of the factor and yet
recognizes that such provisions have a value for multi-state businesses
in planning and conducting their operations, independent of the parti-
cular advantages of the chosen law."
'Another means by which some predictability is sought in the Restatement
(Second) is by a designation of particular kinds of contracts in which, in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, it is believed that a specified.
contact will be given greatest weight. The types of contracts and the state chosen'
for each include the following: contracts for the sale or lease of interest in immov-
ables ( 346e) and contractual duties of grantor of land ( 346f) -situs; contracts to
sell interests in chattels ( 346g)-state where seller is to deliver chattel. (The word
"delivery" was substituted for "surrender" at the Institute meeting; see 37 ALI PRo-
cEEDiNGs 545-48 (1960)) ; life insurance contracts (§ 346h)-state where insured was
domiciled at the time the policy was issued; contracts of fire, surety or casualty in-
surance (§ 346i)-principal location of the insured risk. (Effect will not be given to a
choice of law provision in insurance contracts designating a state whose law gives the
insured less protection than he would receive under the otherwise governing law.
This applies to insurance contracts in §§ 346h and 346i.) ; contracts of suretyship (§
346j)-law governing primary obligation; contracts for the repayment of money
lent (§346k)-state where the contract requires that repayment be made; contracts
for the rendition of services (§346)-state where the contract requires that the
services be rendered; contracts for broker's services in buying or selling securities or
commodities on an exchange (Q 346m)-state where the exchange is located; contracts
of transportation (§ 346n)-state from which the passenger departs or the goods are
dispatched.
In each of the sections, reference is to the "local law" of the indicated state and
in each section, minute details of performance are excepted. Though the designated
contact is said to be the most important, there is recognition that in a particular
instance some other state may have a more significant relationship. Thus, every
section, except § 346j relating to contracts of suretyship, contains a provision of the
following type:
"If the contacts which the contract has with another state are sufficient to establish
a more significant relationship between the contract and the other state, the local law
of the other state will govern." Section 346f is modified but not as to substance.
Section 346j is consistent in calling for the application of "the law governing
the obligation which the contract of suretyship was intended to secure, provided that
the contract of suretyship has a substantial connection with the state whose local law
governs the obligation."
It may be expected that the Washington court will use the suggestions of the
Restatement (Second) as to particular kinds of contracts as guides. Thus, in
Baffin the court relied upon § 3461 (the services under the contract were to be rendered
in Washington) and § 346g (the seller delivered the chattel in Washington) in its
determination of the state of most significant relationship. Likewise, in Goble
particular significance was attached to the place of delivery of possession as stated
in § 346g.
'See Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in
XXTH CENTTRY COMPARATIVE AND CoNFLicTs LAw 349, 359-60 (1961).
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A second limitation is that the contract have some substantial rela-
tionship with the chosen state or that there be some other reasonable
basis for the parties' choice. The intent is to prevent the parties from
avoiding the policies of all the states having a substantial connection.
For example, all the states might place some restriction upon capacity
or the need for consideration. A choice of a state with no relationship
and with different restrictions would be disregarded. 3
The third limitation calls for disregarding the parties' choice if that
law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the state of the
governing law in the absence of an effective choice. Obviously, the
mere fact that a different result would be produced by applying the
chosen law does not call for ignoring it. Yet if care is not taken in
applying this limitation, this could be the result. As an aid in under-
standing what is a fundamental policy, particular attention should be
given to the suggestion that such a policy will rarely be found in
statutes of frauds, rules concerning the capacity of married women,
or general contract rules relating to the need for consideration. 5 A
fundamental policy might be found in a statute making a certain kind
of contract illegal, as one relating to gambling or the sale of liquor, or
a statute designed to protect a person against a superior bargaining
power, as an individual insured against an insurance company.
It is also provided that, "In the absence of a contrary indication of
intention, the reference is to the local law of the chosen state."3 This
accords with the general position of the Restatement (Second') that the
renvoi doctrine should not be applied to contracts and that reference
should be only to the internal law of the other state and not to its
choice of law rules." It is unlikely in the ordinary case that the
parties intended, or even heard of, a reference to the whole law, and
in the event such was their intent, it can be made known and may then
be effectuated.3
'This is modified by the "other reasonable basis" provision, the example given
being a sea carriage contract between two countries with undeveloped legal systems.
In such an instance the parties should be permitted to choose a well-known and highly
developed commercial law.
Compare Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IOWA L. REv. 713, 722-23 (1961).
" For a discussion of some of the difficulties presented by this "fundamental
policy" exception, see Cavers, supra note 32, at 360-61.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332a, comment g (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1960).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332a(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, as
modified Nov. 1960).
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332, comment e and accompany-
ing Reporter's Notes (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
" The black-letter type recognizing the power of the parties to choose the whole
[ VOL. 43 : 309
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Special treatment is given to matters of details of performance and
to the problem of usury. Unlike the original Restatement, no general
distinction is drawn in the tentative draft between matters of validity
and performance. 9 All are governed by the law of the place of most
significant relationship, with the place of performance being one of the
contacts to consider. Provision is made, however, that as to minute
details of performance, the law of the place of performance governs
because such details do not affect the nature of the obligations under
the contract and are of primary concern to the state where the details
are to be carried out. Examples given are questions as to whether the
debtor should be allowed days of grace, the exact time and place at
which performance is due, and the kind of currency in which payment
shall be made. 0
The position of the Restatement on the usury problem is that the
contract will be sustained if it provides for a rate of interest that is
permitted by the general usury law of any state with which the contract
has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate
permitted by the state of the otherwise governing law.4 The rationale
is that since the permissible interest rates ordinarily vary only slightly
from state to state, application of that state's law with the higher rate
will not adversely affect the other state's policies and will effectuate
the parties' expectations of a valid and enforcible contract. 2
Although the contract-choice of law provisions of the Restatement
law was added as a result of discussions at the Institute meeting. See 37 ALl PRO-
CEEDINGS 475-78 (1960).
"The original Restatement made a sharp distinction between matters of validity,
which were said to be governed by the law of the place of contracting, and matters
of performance, which were governed by the law of the place of performance. Compare
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 358 (1934).
'
0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAwS § 346b (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
,RESTATEMMNT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 334d (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
"The rule is criticized in A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 182 (1962).
Neither Baffin nor Goble required a decision as to usury or details of performance.
However, as to usury there is already authority to support the position of the
Restatement, as discussed in text accompanying note 66, infra, and as to both there
was language in Baffin indicating that the Restatement's position would at least be
considered on the proper occasion.
Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 865, 871, 425 P.2d
623, 627 (1967). 'Wee therefore adopt what we consider to be the better rule, viz.,
that the law of the state with which the contract has the most significant relationship,
except perhaps in the unusual case of usury, will govern the validity and effect of a
contract." Also, "The basic rule is that the validity and effect of a contract are
governed by the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship to
the contract, except in the case of usury and except that the details of performance
are still said to be governed by the local law of the place of performance." Id. at 872,
425 P.2d at 627. The stated exceptions were not, however, rules and guidelines
necessary to handle the problem before the court.
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(Second) have fared better in the periodicals than did those of the
original Restatement, 43 numerous criticisms and suggestions have ap-
peared.44 Some of these have been briefly alluded to but require fuller
treatment. They are of particular consequence because, by carefully
restricting the Baffin opinion to the rules and guidelines necessary to
resolve the immediate case, the Washington court indicated it would
not only be receptive to, but would welcome, critical analysis as an aid
in developing its own significant relationship approach.
Professor Cavers has long been critical of so-called "jurisdiction-
selecting rules." These are rules which make a state the object of the
choice without regard to the content of the law that is thereby chosen
or to its effect on the issue before the court.45 Examples are rules call-
ing for the automatic application of the law of the place of making or
place of performance. The Restatement (Second) to a considerable
extent continues the phraseology of jurisdiction-selecting rules, as in
the designation of certain places for particular contracts. However, the
doctrine of most significant relationship as adopted by the Washington
court allows for an approach directed towards a choice of law rather
than a choice of jurisdiction. Only by an investigation of the content of
the various laws can the court make a judgment as to their purposes,
the effect of their application upon the interests of the parties, and the
extent to which their application will effectuate the policies of the
various states.4" "Most significant relationship," in short, allows for
the fullest investigation of those factors that ought to govern the par-
ticular litigation.
That investigation should be made in view of the specific issue to be
resolved. On this aspect the Washington court ought to take a more
positive approach than does the tentative draft, which makes the
following comment:4
7
"E.g., Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases vs. Restatement, 51 YALE
L.J. 893 (1942); Cook, 'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws, 31 ILL. L. REV. 143
(1936).
" E.g., Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in Its Historical Perspective:
Should the Restatement Be Continued?, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 133 (1954); Ehrenzweig,
The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 1230 (1965).
" Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in XXTH
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 349 (1961). See also Cavers, A
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933).
"See Reese, Connents on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 1255-56
(1963).
"r RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332, comment d (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1960). See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS 186-87 (1965) to the effect that the comment "seems unnecessarily vague
and weak."
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Different issues. No categorical statement can be made as to the extent
to which the governing law depends upon the particular issue involved.
The courts frequently state in their opinions, without any attempt at
qualification, that the validity of contracts in general is governed by one
particular law. When making such statements, however, the courts were
undoubtedly concerned primarily with the precise issue before them, and
it is doubtful that they had all questions of validity in mind. Special
rules have in fact been developed in the case of usury (see § 334d) and
of issues involving minute details of performance of a contract (see
§ 346b). Eventually, special rules may be developed for still other
questions.
The fact that the court in Baffin concluded that Washington law
determined whether recovery might be had against the community
property should not automatically mean that all questions relating to
the contract are governed by Washington law. "Most significant re-
lationship" was decided in the setting of only one question and might
very well differ for a different issue, involving different party interests
and state policies4 8 Care must always be exercised to avoid an over-
statement of the actual decision under the Baffin-type analysis because
to overstate reduces flexibility and clouds subsequent analysis.
It is critical not only that the court evaluate the policies of each
state and the interests of the parties as to each issue, but that the
evaluation process be set forth in the opinion. 9 Much of the criticism
directed at a most significant relationship approach, particularly by
Professor Ehrenzweig, is that it is a non-rule"0 or give-it-up formula,5 '
and that it begs the question as there is no guidance for determining
what is most significant. 2 Initially, there is merit in this criticism, and
Baffin recognized that application of its new rule might present some
difficulties at first. However, the uncertainty created can be lessened
over a period of time by clear expression of the process employed. If
the court fully explains its reasoning, more definitive and adequate
guides will develop.
"See the discussion in 37 ALI PROCEEDINGS 507-08 (1960).
" Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in XXTH
CENTURY COMPARATIVE & CoNFLICTs LAW 349, 357-58 (1961).
W Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? Prom Beale to Cavers,
80 HARv. L. REv. 377, 381-82 (1966).
'Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its With-
drawal, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230, 1241 (1965).
'See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1233 (1963);
A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS § 123 (1962); Comment, The Second
Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 762, 772 (1963). See also
D. CAvERS, THE CiroiCE-oF-LAw PROCESS 69-72 (1965).
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A second consideration is that, if this is not done, a set of jurisdic-
tion-selecting rules will be developed and applied to future cases which
may actually involve different policies and interests. Clear statements
of reasons will force counsel and the court to consider those differences.
From this perspective, Baffin is deficient. The court noted the various
contacts with New York and Washington and gave some consideration
to the content of the Washington law and the purposes behind it.
Also, there was discussion of the parties' interests and expectations.
Nothing was said, however, about the content of the New York law or
the policies sought to be effectuated by it. Conceivably there was no
conflict, but if there was, the opinion ought to have given a clearer ex-
pression of why Washington law was chosen. One is left with a listing
of certain contacts and a conclusion that some are more significant
without knowing whether the same significance would be attached to
similar contacts in other like contracts, but with different issues, party
interests, or state laws and policies. Without a clearer expression of
the factors influencing the court's decision, the likelihood is that the
case will be used by counsel and the court in the future for a mechani-
cal selection of a state having similar contacts. In this respect the
Goble opinion is much superior in its more careful analysis of the
purposes of the states' laws and the effect of their application to the
particular issue and parties. If the door to progress which has been
opened by Baffin and Goble is not to be immediately slammed shut,
care must be taken to avoid the obscuring technique of listing contacts
and then concluding that some are more significant.
For a number of years Professor Ehrenzweig has contended for the
so-called rule of validation, whereby that law will be applied which
validates the contract.53 Unquestionably, this is an extremely impor-
tant element as the parties intended and expected a valid contract.
However, there may be modifying circumstances; for example, some
types of contracts are deemed socially undesirable, (i.e., gambling) and
states often seek to protect certain parties and interests, (i.e., minors
'A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 175-176 (1962) ; Ehrenzweig,
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUm. L. REV. 973 (1959). See also Leflar,
Conflict of Laws, Contracts and the New Restatement, 15 ARK. L. REV. 163 (1961) ;
I1. GOODRICH & E. SCOLEs, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 (4th ed. 1964).
Compare the suggested rule in Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IOWA L. REV. 713, 726 (1961): "A
contract is valid if valid under the domestic law of any state which has an interest
in upholding the contract unless there is a state with paramount interest in the
question of its validity under whose domestic law the contract is invalid."
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and insured persons) by invalidating certain contractual provisions.54
The most significant relationship test allows for adequate consideration
of the validation factor. 55
Professor Currie stressed application of the law of the forum if the
court found an unavoidable conflict between the legitimate interests of
two states.5" His original call for forum law was modified by a later
allowance of a "more moderate and restrained interpretation" of each
state's policy, including that of the forum. 7 But in the final analysis if
a conflict remained, forum law should govern. While the forum is not
listed by the Restatement (Second) as one of the factors to be con-
sidered in determining the most significant relationship, 5 it is almost
a certainty that it will be, particularly if there is some other contact
with the forum as will usually be the case. Forum law will be con-
sidered if for no other reason than that counsel and the court will be
most familiar with their own law. Thus, in Baffin much was said of
Washington law and nothing of New York law. There is no reason to
expect, however, that Washington will always apply forum law; the
tenor of Baffin is clearly to the contrary.59
The simple fact is that there is much disagreement among the
scholars and the courts as to the proper approach to the resolution of
choice of law problems, particularly in the contract and tort areas. No
one yet has the answer, and under the realities of the situation the best
that can be done is to suggest factors that ought to be considered.
The Washington court wisely took only the step of casting off old doc-
trine and barely suggesting the new. In this way there can be a natural
rather than a forced growth. When a rule or approach is in develop-
ment, constant reappraisal is required. The most significant relation-
See Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CoxTEP.
PROB. 679, 698 (1963). Professor Ehrenzweig discusses the exception in his TREATISE
ON CoNLricr OF LAWS § 183 (1962).
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 332b(1) (f) (Tent. Draft No. 6, as
modified Nov. 1960) lists as a factor, "the place under whose local law the contract
will be most effective." See 37 ALI PROCEEDINGS 505-07 (1960).
' Professor Currie briefly summarized his approach in E. CHEATHAM, E. GRISWOLD,
W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 447-48(5th ed. 1964).
'See e.g., Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CoNTEmP. PROB.
754, 757-58 (1963).
S The reason is that the Restatement (Second) "is written from the viewpoint of
a neutral forum which has no interest of its own to protect and is seeking only to
apply the most appropriate law." Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,
28 LAW & CONTEmp. PROB. 679, 692-93 (1963).
' See Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1247 (1963),
for observations about the possibility of forum preference under a significant contact
approach.
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ship test allows for and demands this reappraisal." Care should be
taken to maintain the present posture of flexibility for the foreseeable
future. 1
II. FUTURE CHOICE OF LAW IN WASHINGTON
One may query to what extent Baffin actually changes contract-
choice of law doctrines as they have existed in Washington. It will be
recalled that the court stated it had determined to no longer adhere to
the rule of lex loci contractus. Reference was had to the place of mak-
ing which had earlier been defined as the place where the offer was ac-
cepted or where the last act occurred necessary to a meeting of the
minds or to complete the contract.2 If one were to rely upon the
language used in past decisions, clearly the prevailing rule was that of
the place of making. 3 However, in a number of the cases the place of
' See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 267, 302 (1966).
" Despite the criticisms directed at the approach of the Restatement (Second),
there is considerable authority to support it and some indication that the trend of the
decisions is towards its adoption.
See G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICTS OF LAw 232-33 n.37(3d ed. 1963):
"Indeed it is believed that the points-of-contact rule is in the process of out-distanc-
ing all the other rules."
See also H. GOODRICH & E. ScoLEs, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAwS 202
(4th ed. 1064):
More recently, the courts began expressly to adopt the intention and center of
gravity rationalization of the choice of law results in contract cases. With this
has come a renewed analysis in these cases of what the courts, in fact, are and
have been doing. These analyses indicate that the courts are applying the law
of the state to which the parties refer or with which the transaction has its
most significant connection.
And id, at 215,
The trend of the cases in the United States seems definitely to forecast the
eventual abandonment of the fixed reference to the place of making or of per-
formance in favor of the more flexible rule that will enable the courts to give
effective weight to the policy considerations that are present in the area of
contracts.
Cases of particular consequence are Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E. 2d 99
(1954) ; Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961) ;
Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966), at 298 says the
Lilienthal case illustrates an overemphasis on forum policy, and at 318-19, applying
his choice-influencing considerations, concludes that California rather than Oregon
law should have controlled. Likewise, D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS
(1965) at 124 says parochial counsel prevailed and at pages 189-92 is critical of the
result. See also Kay, Book Review, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 341 (1966); and Note, Oregon
Adopts Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law, 17 STAN. L. REv. 750
(1965).
" Norm Advertising, Inc. v. Monroe Street Lumber Co., 25 Wn. 2d 391, 171 P.2d
177 (1946).
In La Selle v. Woolery, 14 Wash. 70, 72, 44 Pac. 115, 116 (1896), the court said,
"The settled rule is that the law of the place where the contract was made must
govern in determining the character, construction and validity of such contract...."
This was the first in the line of community property cases which the court in BaOWn
said it would no longer follow. Others in chronological order were: Clark v. Eltinge.
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performance was in the same state, and in none did it appear that the
parties had intended another law to govern. In fact, authority also
existed supporting application of the law of the place intended by the
parties 4 and of the place of performance. 6 In addition, support could
be found for a rule looking to that law which sustained the validity of
the contract, particularly with respect to allegedly usurious contracts. 0
Out of this background any one of several conclusions might be
drawn as to what has been Washington's choice of law rule. Regardless
of the interpretation of past cases, the approach in Baffin is preferable.
If the rule was one of place of making, or less likely, place of per-
formance, that was too mechanical. Under the new approach, those
factors are still to be considered, but are not necessarily controlling.
29 Wash. 215, 69 Pac. 736 (1902); Huyvaerts v. Roedtz, 105 Wash. 657, 178 Pac. 801
(1919); Meng v. Security State Bank, 16 Wn. 2d 215, 133 P.2d 293 (1943); Achilles
v. Hoopes, 40 Wn. 2d 664, 245 P.2d 1005 (1952); Escrow Service Co. v. Cressler,
59 Wn. 2d 38, 365 P.2d 760 (1961). In Pacific Fin. Corp. v. J. Ed Raymer Co.,
68 Wn. 2d 211, 412 P.2d 120 (1966), the court applied the law of the place of making
to determine the liability of a married woman on a contract of guaranty with respect
to her separate property. The court refrained "at this time from adopting the 'center
of gravity' or 'points of contact' approach to the contracts-choice-of-law problem"
(emphasis original), which in retrospect signaled what was to come in Baffin.
Other cases enunciating or applying the rule of the law of the place of making
are: Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Co., 132 Wash. 108, 231 Pac. 773 (1924); Shaw
Supply Co. v. Nelson Co., 124 Wash. 305, 214 Pac. 19 (1923) ; Gerrick & Gerrick Co.
v. Llewellyn Iron Works, 105 Wash. 98, 177 Pac. 692 (1919) ; Carstens Packing Co. v.
Southern Pac. Co., 58 Wash. 239, 108 Pac. 613 (1910). In Carstens the court said,
"Of course the general rule is that the law of the place of the making of a contract
controls in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto," but refused to
apply that law as being contrary to Washington's public policy.
Parks v. Elmore, 59 Wash. 584, 110 Pac. 381 (1910) applied the law of place of
making to a statute of frauds question. See also It re Stoddard's Estate, 60 Wn. 2d
263, 373 P.2d 116 (1962), holding the Washington Real Estate Brokers' Act not
applicable to an action to recover a broker's commission for sale of Washington
realty, where the contract for the commission was made and performed in Oregon.
But see Farley v. Fair, 144 Wash. 101, 256 Pac. 1031 (1927), applying the Washington
statute of frauds to a broker's contract for sale of Washington realty, which contract
was made and performed in another state by a broker living in that state.
"In Crawford v. Seattle, Renton & S. Ry. Co., 86 Wash. 628, 635, 150 Pac. 1155,
1157 (1915), the court said:
It is well settled by the authorities that the parties to a contract may make the
same with reference to the laws of any state or country and have their contractual
rights governed thereby, provided only that such laws have a real and not a mere
fictitious connection with the subject-matter of the transaction.
The court suggested the place of intention would prevail over the place of making
in Williams v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass'n, 45 Wn. 2d 209, 229, 273 P.2d 803,
815 (1954) : "In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the law of the place
where the contract is entered into controls the determination of the rights and liabili-
ties of the parties thereunder." Accord, Norm Advertising, Inc. v. Monroe Street
Lumber Co., 25 Wn. 2d 391, 171 P.2d 177 (1946), and Phoenix Packing Co. v.
Humphrey-Ball Co., 58 Wash. 396, 108 Pac. 952 (1910).
Mirgon v. Sherk, 196 Wash. 690, 693, 84 P.2d 362, 363 (1938): "It is the general
rule that a contract must be construed in accordance with the laws of the place of
performance."
' Compare Bank v. Doherty, 42 Wash. 317, 84 Pac. 872 (1906) (note executed and
payable in another state, secured by mortgage on realty in Washington; court applied
1967]
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Likewise, if the rule was one of place of intention or of the law that
would sustain validity, those factors retain their position as primary
considerations. If the situation was one of multiple rules with the
court picking the one it thought appropriate to the particular case,
then Baflin is not as revolutionary as might first appear. In the broad
perspective of all the cases, one wonders whether the court may not
have been applying the law of the state of most significant relationship
all along.67 To the extent that this has been so, and it appears as the
most likely possibility, the Baffin approach is preferable in better di-
recting counsel's attention to a consideration of those factors which
ought to determine the outcome of a choice of law case. With the aid
of counsel, the court will be better able to determine the most signifi-
cant relationship to a particular transaction and particular parties in
light of the policies of the respective states.
Conceivably, the court might have achieved the same results without
the language of "most significant relationship" or "center of gravity."
The court might have talked solely in terms of policies and interests.
Much more important, however, is the fact that the court has en-
couraged counsel to offer new solutions, new approaches, new insights.
A striking example of what can be achieved is the Goble case, com-
mendably resulting in the discard of La Selle v. Woolery after some 70
years. There is every reason to expect comparable, though perhaps less
spectacular, developments in future contract-choice of law decisions.
Other areas will be affected as well.
In Baffin the court noted the recent adoption of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and said this was "suggestive of the significant relation-
ship approach." Subsection 1 of RCW 62A.1-105 provides that if a
transaction bears a "reasonable relation" to this and another state, the
parties may agree that the law of either shall apply. In the event no
choice is made, the Code applies to transactions bearing an "appropri-
ate relation to this state." Subsection 2 lists exceptions in which other
law of other state to sustain against contention of usury) with Crawford v. Seattle,
Renton & S.Ry. Co., 86 Wash. 628, 150 Pac. 1155 (1915) (contract made and to be
performed in another state, secured by trust deeds on property in Washington, which
was also the place of business of the debtor; court applied law of Washington to
sustain against contention of usury). The usurious contract will not be sustained if
bad faith is established. Mirgon v. Sherk, 196 Wash. 690, 84 P.2d 362 (1938).
The three Washington cases accord with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 334d (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960), which relates to usury.
'E.Y.. Williams v. Steamship Mutual Underwriting Ass'n, 45 Wn. 2 d 209, 273
P.2d 803 (1954); Hatcher v. Idaho Gold & Ruby Mining Co., 106 Wash. 108, 179 Pac.
106 (1919) ; Phoenix Packing Co. v. Humphrey-Ball Co., 58 Wash. 396, 108 Pac. 952
(1910); Carstens Packing Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 58 Wash. 239, 108 Pac. 613 (1910).
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provisions of the Code specify the applicable law. In such situations
agreements to the contrary are effective only to the extent permitted
by the law, including the conflict of laws rules, so specified.6
Outside the areas covered by the exceptions, the terms "reasonable
relation" and "appropriate relation" allow for flexibility and adaptabil-
ity to the particular issue, comparable to the term "most significant
relationship." Both approaches also allow for considerable party auton-
omy. A vital distinction between the two is that a transaction could
bear an "appropriate relation" to this state without this state having
the "most significant relationship."" Washington's internal law em-
bodied in the Code would apply to such a transaction, but not that law
outside the Code. Despite this difference whereby Washington's in-
ternal law will more likely be applied to Code than non-Code trans-
actions, both approaches are alike in removing some of the traditional
impediments to choice of law development, as by rejecting lex loci
contractus, and in encouraging creative thought.71
There is reason to believe that torts-choice of law will be affected
by Baffin. Certainly from a national standpoint, torts has been an area
of even more striking development than conitracts. 2 Until recently
courts with little or no dissent had applied the law of the place of in-
jury to determine rights and liabilities in tort. This is based upon the
vested rights theory: the right to recover is created by and dependent
upon the law of the state where the tort occurred.73 Recently, however,
WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.1-105 (1967) provides:
(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation' to this state and also to another state or nation the parties
may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall
govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Title applies to
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state. (2) Where one of the
following provisions of this Title specifies the applicable law, that provision
governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the
law (including the conflict of laws rules) so specified: Rights of creditors
against sold goods. RCW 62A.2-402. Applicability of the Article on Bank
Deposits and Collections. RCW 62A.4-102. Bulk transfers subject to the Article
on Bulk Transfers. RCW 62A.6-102. Applicability of the Article on Investment
Securities. RCW 62A.8-106. Policy and scope of the Article on Secured Trans-
actions. RCW 62A.9-102 and RCW 62A.9-103.
'See Tuchler, Boundaries to Party Autonomy in the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Radical View, 11 ST. Louis L.J. 180 (1967).
7 See UNFOm CommERcIAL CODE § 1-105, Comment 3.
' Discussions of the Code may be found in D. CAVERs, THE CHOIcE-oF-LAw
PRocEss 233-40 (1965); Nordstrom, Choice of Law and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 364 (1963); Burton, The Uniform Commercial Code and
Conflict of Laws. 9 Am. J. ComP. L. 458 (1960).
" Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,
80 HARv. L. REv. 377, 378, 383 (1966).
"See RESTATEMENT OF ComiicT OF LAws § 377 (1934).
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several states have adopted more flexible approaches.74 Of these, New
York has been the scene of the most important battles and most noted
decisions.
The best known is Babcock v. Jackson.75 Plaintiff and defendant,
residents of New York, went for a week-end trip to Canada in defen-
dant's automobile. While driving in Ontario, defendant lost control of
the car, hit a wall, and plaintiff was seriously injured. Ontario had a
guest statute which eliminated owner and driver liability for injury to
a passenger. Although New York law did not bar recovery, defendant
moved for dismissal of the New York action on the ground that the law
of the place of injury governed. Just as it had abandoned the tra-
ditional contract rules nine years earlier in Auten v. Auten7 6 the New
York court in Babcock did the same as to torts. The court said that
effect would be given to the law of that state which because of its
relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties had the
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation. Al-
though Ontario law might govern an issue as to standard of conduct,
the court, after evaluating the policies sought to be effectuated by New
York and Ontario, applied New York law to determine the liability of
the driver to his passenger. The court concluded that the policy behind
the Ontario statute was to protect Ontario insurers against fraudulent
claims, and that this was irrelevant because no Ontario resident or
insurer was involved. New York on the other hand had a policy requir-
ing a negligent driver to compensate his guest, and the case involved
New York parties, a trip beginning and intended to end in New York,
and a car garaged, licensed, and "undoubtedly" insured in New York.
Whereas the court in Auten had simply indicated the various contacts,
in Babcock it evaluated those contacts in light of the policies of the
respective states. Babcock made clear that a "center of gravity" or
"grouping of contacts" approach is not inconsistent with a policy-
oriented analysis. To the contrary, the latter is necessary to make the
former intellectually acceptable.
Since 1963 torts has dominated the cases and commentaries in choice
of law problems. While scholars have differed in their interpretations
of Babcock and its meaning, generally the case has been favorably re-
ceived for its rejection of the traditional place of injury rule and its
R eese, Conflict of Laws & The Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONrEMP. PROB.
679, 699 (1963).
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
- 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
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substitution of a more flexible approach directed at resolving a par-
ticular issue.77 As it did with contracts, so with torts, the Restatement
(Second) calls for the application of the law of the state with the most
significant relationship.78 In New York a series of cases has applied
and extended Babcock, resulting in much commentary in periodicals.79
While many courts have not been confronted with the problem and
some have expressly elected to retain the place of injury formula, 80
others have joined New York in rejecting the traditional approach. 81
The most important case is Clark v. Clark,82 which excellently
illustrates how a choice of law problem ought to be approached. Mr.
and Mrs. Clark, domiciliaries of New Hampshire, left their home on a
trip to another point in New Hampshire, intending to return the same
day. The trip took them into Vermont where an accident occurred.
Comments upon the case by Professors Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig,
Leflar and Reese may be found in 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1212 (1963).
l, REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964)
provides:
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with
the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in
tort. (2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the
state of most significant relationship include: (a) the place where the injury
occurred, (b) the place where the conduct occurred, (c) the domicile, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. (3) In deter-
mining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum will consider the
issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the
interested states.
For a critical comment, see Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule";
Threat and Promise in Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847 (1967), and
Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts:
Law and Reason versus the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CoNTEmr. PRoB. 700
(1963).
r In chronological order the cases are Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111,
204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965) (suit on Puerto Rican direct action statute) ;
Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (involved
Colorado host-guest statute) ; Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213
N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965) (wrongful death suit); Macey v. Rozbicld,
18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966) (involved Ontario host-guest
statute). See also Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aff'd,
26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966) (involved Ontario host-guest statute).
For discussions of Babcock and other recent cases, see Collins, Interaction
Between Contract &' Tort in the Conflict of Laws, 16 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 103 (1967) ;
Note, Predictability Versus Flexibility: The Conflict in Conflict of Laws, 18 W.
REs. L. REv. 938 (1967); Note, The Impact of Babcock v. Jackson on Conflict of
Laws, 52 VA. L. REv. 302 (1966) ; Note, The Aftermath of Babcock, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
1301 (1966).
'White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966); Landers v. Landers, 153
Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966) ; Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del., 1965). See also
McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); Cherokee Labs, Inc. v. Rogers,
398 P.2d 520 (Okla.,1965) ; Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
"Casey v. Manson Const. & Eng. Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Ore., 1967); Baits v. Balts,
273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133
N.W.2d 408 (1965); Fabricus v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965);
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
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Mrs. Clark, the passenger, instituted an action against her husband
alleging negligence by him in the operation of the car. Vermont has a
guest statute, but New Hampshire does not.
The New Hampshire court rejected a mechanical application of the
place of injury rule because the rule overlooked considerations that
should underlie choice of law adjudications. In place of the traditional
rule, the court relied upon five choice-influencing considerations sug-
gested by Professor Leflar:3 predictability of results, maintenance of
interstate and international order, simplification of the judicial task,
advancement of the forum's governmental interest, and application of
the better rule of law. The first three were found to be largely irrele-
vant for the immediate case. As to the fourth, the court noted New
Hampshire had an interest because the parties were domiciled there,
the car kept there, and the short trip was to begin and end there.
Vermont's interest under its guest statute was found to be in suits in
its own courts affecting hosts, guests, and insurance companies of that
state. Finally, guest statutes were found to be growing in disfavor and
New Hampshire, without a guest statute, was said to have the "better"
law.8
4
The result, whereby New Hampshire law was applied, is commend-
able. Of more importance than the immediate result is the fact that
the court was struggling with factors of consequence to the actual issue
before it. Perhaps the Washington court was doing something com-
parable in Baffin. If so, Clark is preferable because the court more
clearly indicated the influencing considerations. This gives greater
assurance that the result is not reached simply by contact-counting
and also serves as a basis whereby in time more definitive guides may
be developed to aid counsel in negotiations and courts in resolving
disputes.
At the present time Washington still applies the orthodox place of
injury rule to tort-choice of law problems.8 5 It will be recalled that
' Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv.
267 (1966).
" For favorable reaction to the better law consideration, see Ehrenzweig, A
Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REv. 377,
397-98 (1966). Compare Note, 42 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 565 (1967). See also Note,
52 IOWA L. REv. 1004 (1967); Note, 45 N.C.L. REv. 505 (1967); Note, 20 ARK. L. REv.
359 (1967); Note, 18 S. CAR. L. REv. 880 (1966).
' "The accident having occurred in the state of Idaho, the host-guest statute of
Idaho governs as to defendant's liability." Griswold v. Ramsey, 62 Wn. 2d 700, 703,
384 P.2d 635 (1963). Barrett v. Faltico, 117 F.Supp. 95 (E.D. Wash. 1953); Richard-
son v. Pac. P. & L. Co., 11 Wn. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941); Reynolds v. Day, 79
Wash. 499, 140 Pac. 681 (1914).
Washington's approach in workmen's compensation cases is discussed in Samuel-
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the Auten case in New York, with its adoption of the "center of
gravity" approach for contracts, was the forerunner of Babcock, which
applied a comparable test for torts. The obvious question is whether
Baffin and its "most significant relationship" approach will be extended
to torts. The prediction is that it will. 6
It is almost certain that there will be a different result with respect
to community liability for torts committed by one of the spouses out-
side Washington. In the past the Washington position has been that
an obligation, either contract or tort, incurred by one of the spouses in
a non-community property state could not be enforced against com-
munity property in Washington. In Goble the court in a contract
dispute rejected the characterization analysis of the past and looked to
the laws and policies of the concerned states, whereby it found there
was not a true choice of law problem. "We conclude, therefore, that
the second La Selle case and its progeny, which Baffin (supra) deter-
mined is no longer applicable as to the contract-choice of law question,
should no longer be adhered to on the question of community liability
involved here."88  (Emphasis added.) The progeny of La Selle in-
cludes tort as well as contract. The same reasons that lead to com-
munity liability in contract should result in community liability in
tort. Interestingly, one of the hypotheticals relied upon by Judge
Finley in Goble to justify the conclusion of community liability was
tortious in nature.8 9
son, Extraterritorial Effect of the Washington Workmen's Compensation Act and
Constitutional Implications, 32 WAsH. L. REv. 386 (1957).
'In Oliver v. Am. Motors Corp., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 845, 425 P.2d 647 (1967), which
was decided the day before Baffin and Goble, the court cited RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLIcT OF LAws § 377 (1934), defining the place of wrong. This was done in the setting
of determining the application of Washington's long-arm statute, however, and does
not mean that Washington will continue to apply the mechanical rule of the original
Restatement as to torts.
'The contract cases are set forth in note 13, supra. The tort cases are Maag v.
Voykovich, 46 Wn. 2d 302, 280 P.2d 680 (1955) and Mountain v. Price, 20 Wn. 2d 129,
146 P.2d 327 (1944). Both stated that the law of the place where a tort is committed
controls questions in connection with the act, the responsibility therefor, and the
nature of the cause of action based thereon. Because a tort committed in a non-
community property state was separate in nature, it followed, said the court, that
responsibility therefore was separate in nature in that state and in Washington.
'Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v. Goble, 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 879, 885, 425 P.2d 631,
634(1967).
Id. at 884, 425 P.2d at 634:
As was said in Marsh, op. cit. supra at 153, in regard to Mountain v. Price, 20
Wash. 2d 129, 146 P.2d 327 (1944), a tort case of the second La Selle decision ilk:
"By the rationale of this case if a married man domiciled in Washington should
drive down the highway on 'community business' and negligently strike Plaintiff
A ten feet on the Washington side of the state line, and then negligently strike
Plaintiff B ten feet on the Oregon side of the line, and both sued in the Wash-
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It is conceivable that the court might extend the Goble reasoning
to resolve the tort-community property problem without extending the
"most significant relationship" test of Baffin to the entire area of torts.
However, Baffin and Goble should be considered together as represent-
ing a new approach to the resolution of choice of law problems, an
approach applying equally well to tort as to contract. The same factors
that argue against application of the vested right doctrine in contract,
resulting in the law of place of making, apply to the vested right
doctrine in tort, resulting in the law of place of injury. Both are
mechanical rules without regard to the interests of the parties and
states involved. In Baffin the court referred to the absurdity of placing
the choice of law necessarily on the possibly fortuitous event of place
of execution."° The same absurdity may result from considering only
the possible fortuitous event of place of injury. If the court is willing
to apply a flexible test to contract, there is equal, and perhaps greater
reason, to expect its application in tort where predictability of result
and expectations of the parties are ordinarily of lesser consequence.
If contacts and policies are of ow consequence in contract-choice of law
problems, they are equally of consequence in tort-choice of law
problems."
The possible effect of such an approach in a tort setting may be
illustrated by Jeffrey v. Whitworth College.9 2 Plaintiff, a resident of
California, was a student at Whitworth, a charitable institution orga-
nized and operating in Washington. Plaintiff was injured on a college-
sponsored tobogganing excursion in Idaho, allegedly through the neg-
ligence of the college. Under Idaho law the college was immune from
ington court, Plaintiff A could levy on community property to satisfy his
obligation but Plaintiff B could not. This is not the result of applying Oregon
law to the second case (although the court thought so), but an arbitrary discrimi-
nation by the Washington court. [Italics ours]'"
Washington's position in the tort cases is critically discussed in H. MARSH,
MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 152-54 (1952), See also Judge Hill's con-
curring opinion in Maag v. Voykovich, 46 Wn. 2d 302, 280 P.2d 680 (1955), and
Note, 31 WASH. L. REv. 119 (1956).
' "I have sometimes remarked to a class in the conflict of laws, that, if the
teachers of that subject were deprived of the adjective 'fortuitous,' instruction in
its mysteries would soon slow to a halt." CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS
311 (1963).
"' Property-choice of law rules may also be affected by Baflin. See Weintraub, An
Inquiry into the Utility of "Situs" as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis, 52 CoR. L.Q.
1 (1966); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 267, 305-06 (1966). Compare Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts
Lawf From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L. R.v. 377, 381 (1966).
While the impact on areas other than contract and tort may be less, the approach
of Baffin is, and should be, adaptable to all choice of law problems.
9 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wash. 1955).
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liability, but immunity had been abolished in Washington.9" The
United States District Court, following Washington's traditional
choice-of-law rule, granted summary judgment for the college under
Idaho law. 4
The result turned upon an automatic application of a rule without
any consideration of the interests of the parties or the policies of the
states involved. A better approach would be that employed by the
New Hampshire court in Clark. The first of the choice-influencing
considerations listed there is predictability of results. While this is
usually of lesser consequence in tort than contract, it is more likely
that the parties would have expected a question relating to the im-
munity of the college to be governed by the law of the state where
the college was incorporated, where the student attended school, and
where the relationship was entered into, than by the law of the place
of the accident. In determining whether to procure insurance, the
reasonable expectation of the defendant college would have been to
look to the law of Washington, the state in which it primarily con-
ducted its activities. The second consideration is the maintenance of
reasonable orderliness and good relationship among the states, which
in this instance would allow for the application of the law of either
state. Likewise, the third consideration, simplification of the judicial
task, would support application of either state's law, Washington's as
the law of the forum with which the court is most familiar and Idaho's
as the mechanical application of a choice of law rule.
A more important consideration in this instance is advancement of
the forum's governmental interest, which is not necessarily synony-
mous with its internal law. Washington has an interest in its colleges
and the students attending them and has concluded there should be
liability. It is difficult to find an Idaho interest in providing immunity
to a Washington college. If the laws were reversed and it were Idaho
that imposed liability, arguably Idaho law should govern to effectuate
its policy of protecting persons injured by charities, a policy the char-
'Reliance was placed upon Pierce v. Yakima Valley Ass'n, 43 Wn. 2d 162, 260
P.2d 765 (1953). While the doctrine of charitable immunity from tort liability there-
after had a brief resurgence (see Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical Free Church, 47
Wn. 2d 202, 287 P.2d 128 (1955), and Pederson v. Immanuel Lutheran Church, 57 Wn.
2d 576, 358 P.2d 549 (1961), it has since been abrogated in its entirety. Friend v. Cove
Methodist Church, Inc., 65 Wn. 2d 174, 396 P.2d 546 (1964). "
"The court noted that the accident occurred in 1952, whereas Washington did
not abolish the doctrine of charitable tort immunity until 1953, so that even if
Washington law were looked to (by reference back from Idaho), defendant was
immune. This was dictum, however, and principal reliance was placed upon the
application of Idaho law as that of the place of wrong.
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ity could reasonably be expected to be bound by when acting in Idaho.
But in this instance no purpose of Idaho is served by application of its
law. An application of Washington's law would further the Washing-
ton policy of encouraging care on the part of its charities without in
any way imposing upon an interest of Idaho. Likewise, the fifth con-
sideration, application of the better rule, supports Washington's law.
Socio-economic conditions in general and the availability of insurance
in particular support rejection of the charitable immunity doctrine, as
represented by the trend of authorities. 5 Whether one speaks in terms
of significant relationship as in Baffin, or choice-influencing considera-
tions as in Clark, Washington law ought to govern."6
III. CONCLUSION
With Baffin and Goble the Washington court has taken the first step
in evolving a new choice of law doctrine. While phrased in terms of a
"most significant relationship" formula, the court made clear that the
approach will be of its own making and not necessarily that of the
Restatement (Second) or of any other single authority. The court
wisely adopted "only so many rules and guidelines as are necessary to
handle the problems before us."
Counsel can no longer rely upon the mechanical rules of the past but
rather must think more creatively about what factors relate to solu-
tions of choice of law problems. Fortunately, there are some guides.
Examples are the choice-influencing considerations of Professor
Leflar,97 the policies underlying choice of law as stated by Professors
"' W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 (3d ed. 1964), "In short, the
immunity of charities is clearly in full retreat; and it may be predicted with some
confidence that the end of the next two decades will see its virtual disappearance
from American law." See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 29.16-29.17 (1956).
"0 The Jeffrey case is noted critically in Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Neces-
sary?, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 657, 668 (1959).
D. CAVERS, TR CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 19-32 (1965), hypothesizes the opinions
of "Judges" Griswold, Rheinstein, Reese, Currie and Cavers in a comparable
imaginary case.
See also Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLU.m. L. REv. 1233, 1238
(1963), and Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of
Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Cli. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1960), discussing a comparable
New York case, decided prior to Babcock. Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels,
Inc., 6 App.Div. 2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1958), modified in 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158
N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959).
" Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv.
267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,
54 CALIF L. REv. 1584 (1966). In both articles Professor Leflar applies the consider-
ations in resolving some recent choice of law cases.
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Cheatham and Reese,"5 the more specific "principles of preference" of
Professor Cavers, 9 and the identification of the state of most signifi-
cant relationship in certain cases in the Restatement (Second). 1°a0
The "most significant relationship" test as adopted by the Washington
court allows for the use of these and other suggestions in its imple-
mentation.
Many of these are very general and even those that are specific
should not be regarded as binding. They are only guides, only factors
to consider. Admittedly, this results in uncertainty and unpredictabil-
ity. In time perhaps more specific rules will be developed. If that
happens, benefit will have been derived from the re-thinking engen-
dered by a consideration of the policies of the states involved in light
of the particular parties and issue.
More likely, the certainty of the past will never be achieved under
the new approach. One wonders whether certainty is even possible in
view of the variant considerations involved. This can be ameliorated
somewhat, however, if the court is careful in future cases to delineate
what factors influenced it in what way and to what degree. Counsel
will then be better able to predict than would be true if only contacts
were listed. Likewise, the court will be less likely to simply count
contacts to find the most significant relationship.
The evolutionary process has finally begun in Washington. It will
be a long time in developing. The limitations on that development are
only those imposed by the ingenuity, insights and degree of in-depth
research and work of counsel and the court.' 0
S Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 959 (1952),
lists the following: the needs of the interstate and international systems; a court
should apply its ovn local law unless there is good reason for not doing so; a court
should seek to effectuate the purpose of its relevant local law rule in determining a
question of choice of law; certainty, predictability, uniformity of result; protection
of justified expectations; application of the law of the state of dominant interest;
ease in determination of the applicable law, convenience of the court; the fundamental
policy underlying the broad local law field involved; justice in the individual case.I D. CAVERS, TME C oIcE-oF-LAw PROCESS (1965).
" E.g., REsTATEmENT (SEcOm) OF CoN cIT oF LAvs §§ 346e-346n (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1960) and §§ 379a-379k (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
'An excellent example of the type of research and analysis which should be
applied to a choice of law decision is D. Trautman, Two View.7 on Kell v.
Henderson--A Comment, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 465 (1967).
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